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The Supreme Court and the Shareholder 
Litigant: Basic, Inc. v. Levinson 
in Context 
Jayne W. Barnard* 
Twenty-five years ago, in J./. Case Co. v. Borak,l the United States 
Supreme Court unanimously held that, in order to effectively supple-
ment the often~overwhelmed enforcement efforts of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), it would recognize an implied 
right of action, enabling private investors to seek damages and other 
relief under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 
Six years later, the Court enhanced the incentives for private en-
forcement by providing for the award of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in 
Exchange Act cases.a 
Then, in 1971, in a case brought under rule lOb-5 of the Exchange 
Act,4 the Court opened the courthouse doors to litigants claiming 
fraud in any way "touching" the purchase or sale of securities.s 
These invitations quickly bore fruit, and in the early 1970's, federal 
securities litigation blossomed. Both private plaintiffs and the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission increasingly sought federal court res-
olution of disputes related to securities transactions. In the course of 
five years, the federal courts' inventory of securities-related suits 
doubled. 
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of Wil-
liam and Mary, Virginia. This article is in memory of Arnold Shure. John C. Tucker 
contributed to its concept and form, and I am grateful for his helpful suggestions. 
James Anastos, Daniel Bennett, and Michael Grattan provided research assistance. 
1. 377 u.s. 426 (1964). 
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982). 
3. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). 
5. Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 
6, 12-13 (1971). 
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Fiscal 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Lawsuits commenced 
in federal courts6 
1211 
1962 
1919 
1999 
2378 
2408 
Lawsuits commenced 
by the SEC7 
111 
140 
119 
178 
148 
174 
Throughout this period, however, Chief Justice Burger and others 
increasingly decried the weight of the federal court caseload.s The 
Chief Justice in particular lamented that, while many decisions in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s had added "new burdens" to the fed-
eral docket,9 "no decision of the courts ha[d] subtracted any signifi-
cant burden from the avalanche which ha[d] fallen upon the Federal 
Courts."lO 
Chief Justice Burger's words were prophetic in that, in a cluster of 
decisions issued between 1975 and 1979,11 the Supreme Court did pre-
cisely what he had been hoping for-it sharply circumscribed the 
ability of the federal courts to hear securities-related disputes, partic-
ularly those initiated by private shareholders as class actions. While 
these decisions were consistent with the Court's contemporaneous at-
tempts to limit federal court access generally, for example by rede-
fining concepts of federalism and abstention,l2 standing,l3 implied 
private rights of actionl4 and class actions,1s the rhetoric of the secur-
6. REPORTS, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, U.S. COURTS, 
Table 2C (1970-1988). 
7. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORTS (1970-1988). 
8. E.g., Burger, Has the Time Come?, 55 F.R.D. 119 (1972) (noting expansion in 
federal district court filings from over 88,000 in fiscal year 1959 to over 140,000 in fiscal 
year 1972); A. BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT-AND WHAT IF ANY-
THING TO Do ABOUT IT (1973) (reporting on the recommendations of a court-appointed 
study group reviewing problems of court administration, including elimination of stat-
utory three-judge courts, establishment of an administrative body to hear prisoner 
complaints, improvement of court secretarial services and the establishment of a Na-
tional Court of Appeals). 
9. Burger, supra note 8, at 120. 
10. !d. 
11. See infra notes 93-156 and accomp~ying text. 
12. E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
13. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to 
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
14. E.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Na-
tional Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). 
15. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (imposing on the plain-
tiff class representative in rule 23(b)(3) cases costs of notifying class members of their 
right to opt-out); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (restricting use 
of the class action form in diversity cases). See generally Morrison, Rights Without 
Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Federal Courts Out of the Business of Protect-
ing Federal Rights, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 841 (1977) (reviewing the Court's use of "de-
vices used to deny access to federal courts"); Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New 
Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665 
(1987) (tracing the actions of the Burger Court in impeding the enforcement of rights 
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ities law cases focused specifically on problems associated with corpo-
rate governance. The Court made it clear that shareholders and their 
"strike suits" against corporate managers, like prisoners suing their 
wardens16 or soldiers suing their commanding officers,17 were disfa-
vored in the federal forum.1s 
The Court's decisions in this period can be viewed as serving two 
complementary purposes. By presenting a hostile face to shareholder 
litigation, the Court sought to limit the filing of cases which, 
although comprising only a small percentage of the federal docket,19 
occupy a vastly disproportionate amount of judicial time and atten-
tion due to their complexity.zo The Court also found a ready vehicle 
by which to give expression to the "pro-business" philosophy of an in-
creasingly conservative Court.21 
Not surprisingly, court filings under the Securities Act and Securi-
ties Exchange Act (particularly those brought by private plaintiffs) 
precipitously declined.22 
Fiscal 
Year 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Lawsuits commenced 
in federal courts 
2230 
1960 
1703 
1508 
Lawsuits commenced 
by the SEC 
158 
166 
135 
108 
Despite the Court's limiting decisions, however, the activity attend-
ant to the "economic recovery" of the early 1980s and the takeover 
frenzy which accompanied it (marking the emergence of new take-
over defenses of contested legitimacy) generated renewed invocation 
of the federal securities laws. The federal court securities caseload 
by construction of "procedural barriers that leave victims without a practical 
remedy"). 
16. Cf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
17. Cf. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
18. See infra notes 93-156 and accompanying text. Judicial hostility to share-
holder suits has a long history. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 
(1949) (recounting the origins of the derivative action, and noting that it was fre-
quently abused by "small and irresponsible ... stockholders"). 
19. Cases filed under the federal securities and commodities laws during fiscal 
year 1988 totalled 2649. The total number of cases of all categories filed during the 
year was 240,821. 
20. Securities cases frequently involve multiple defendants. They are frequently 
document-intensive, technically complicated and, because of the economic resources 
(including insurance) of the defendants, vigorously defended. 
21. Cf. Cohen & Milstein, The Burger Court and Business, in THE BURGER COURT: 
RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME COURT 1969-1986 (Schwartz ed. 1987) (focusing 
on the pro-business orientation of the Court's anti-trust cases during this period). 
22. See supra notes 6 & 7. 
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again doubled in a five-year period:23 
Fiscal 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Lawsuits commenced 
in federal courts 
1694 
1768 
2376 
2915 
3142 
3266 
Lawsuits commenced 
by the SEC 
103 
115 
136 
151 
179 
143 
The Chief Justice's complaints about the federal court caseload and 
attendant discovery abuses had not abated, however,24 and an in-
creasingly conservative Court still had available to it new mecha-
nisms by which to exclude shareholders from the federal system. 
Most notably in its decisions enforcing the use of brokerage firm ar-
bitration agreements,2s the Court continued in its efforts to curtail 
use of the federal courts for the resolution of claims brought by 
shareholders. Curiously, the Court's ruling in Landreth Timber Co. 
v. Landreth,26 which rejected the "sale of business" doctrine, had just 
the opposite result of encouraging resort to federal courts where pre-
viously disputes had been consigned to non-federal venues. 
By the late-1980s, even as publicity about securities law violations 
was becoming a staple of the popular press, the Supreme Court's ac-
tions and, perhaps, the decline in the size of the shareholder pool,27 
led to a new decline in federal court lawsuits seeking enforcement of 
the securities laws.2s 
Fiscal 
Year 
Lawsuits commenced 
in federal courts 
Lawsuits commenced 
by the SEC 
1986 3059 163 
1987 3020 142 
1988 2649 n/a 
Then, following hard on the heels of the November 1987 "market 
break," the Supreme Court issued its decision in Basic, Inc. v. Levin-
son,29 sanctioning entirely new avenues of shareholder redress under 
the federal securities laws. By rejecting a "bright line" test for deter-
mining the materiality of communications to shareholders,3o the 
Court virtually ~ssured that corporate disclosure decisions would 
23. See supra notes 6 & 7. 
24. See Burger, The Time is Now for the Intercircuit Panel-The State of the Judi-
ciary Address, 71 A.B.A. J. 86, 87 (Apr. 1985) (noting 5100 cases on the Supreme Court 
docket in the 1984 term compared to 1463 in 1953). 
25. See infra note 158. 
26. 471 u.s. 681 (1985). 
27. By 1986, institutional investors held 42.7% of the total market value of Ameri-
can equity investments. COLUMBIA CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, INSTITU-
TIONAL INVESTOR PROJECT (Nov. 1988). 
28. See supra notes 6 & 7. 
29. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988). 
30. See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text. 
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more frequently be challenged by disgruntled shareholders. And, 
even more significantly, by embracing the "fraud-on-the-market" 
theory,31 the Court in Basic seemed yet again, and at a crucial time,32 
to be opening the door to increased shareholder enforcement of the 
federal securities laws. 
However, this reading of Basic may be misleading. The Basic deci-
sion is the result of an unrepresentative panel and the work of an un-
likely author.33 Three of the most conservative members of the 
Court-Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy-did not participate 
in the Basic decision. Justices White and O'Connor, who did, joined 
only in the materiality portion of the decision, but dissented from the 
adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory.34 
Moreover, Basic must be read in light of its history. This article 
explores that history, and its implications for the shareholder litigant 
in the future. Part I traces the Court's securities law decisions from 
Borak forward, focusing on the shifting balance from a liberal Court 
which favored multiple methods of securities law enforcement to a 
conservative Court bent on limiting shareholders' remedies, particu-
larly in the class action context.35 This articie will examine espe-
cially the developing views of those Justices who now comprise the 
plurality in Basic-Justices Blackmuii, Brennan, Marshall and Ste-
vens. Part II explores Basic itself and its upside potential for future 
types of shareholder litigation. It notes the ironic situation in which 
the non-plurality Justices now find themselves-on the one hand 
favoring strict docket control and corporate freedom from share-
holder "harassment," while on the other embracing economic theo-
ries which favor shareholder litigants heretofore excluded from 
federal courts. 
31. See infra notes 212-36 and accompanying text. 
32. Smart & Zigas, Watchdog Woes: Up Against it at the SEC, Bus. WK., Oct. 10, 
1988, at 120 (detailing the serious lack of resources available to Commission for use in 
enforcement). 
33. See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text. 
35. A number of articles have focused on the Court's dramatic shift of emphasis in 
securities cases as between the Warren Court and the Burger Court through the 1970s. 
See, e.g., Allen, Rule 10b-5 and the Burger Court-Time to Reexamine the Elements for 
a 10b-5 Action, 82 CoM. L.J. 118 (1977); Freeman, A Study in Contrasts: The Warren 
and Burger Courts Approach to the Securities Laws, 83 DICK. L. REV. 183 (1978); Ha-
zen, Symposium Introduction-The Supreme Court and the Securities Laws: Has the 
Pendulum Slowed?, 30 EMORY L.J. 5 (1981); Whitaker & Rotch, The Supreme Court 
and the Counter-Revolution in Securities Regulation, 30 ALA. L. REV. 335 (1979); Note, 
The Supreme Court's Trimming of the Section 10(b) Tree: The Cultivation of a New 
Securities Law Perspective, 3 J. CORP. L. 112, 129-37 (1977). 
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I. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE SECURITES LAWS: 1964-1989 
A. 1964-1969: The Warren Court and the Borak Case-Recognizing 
the Need for Private Enforcement 
In the Fall of 1956, J.l. Case Co., a midwestern farm-machinery 
concern, and American Tractor Corporation proposed to merge. Carl 
H. Borak, a Case shareholder, sought to enjoin the merger on the 
grounds, inter alia, that its terms were unfair to Case shareholders. 
When the injunction was denied and the merger went forward, 
Borak amended his complaint to seek rescission and damages, relying 
on the anti-fraud provisions of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. 
Case and its managers argued that investors had no private rights 
under the proxy provisions of the Exchange Act-and indeed none 
were expressly set forth-but the Supreme Court held otherwise, as-
serting that "(p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules provides a nec-
essary supplement to [SEC] action."36 Noting the thousands of proxy 
statements submitted to the SEC each year, the Court recognized 
that deputization of shareholders would serve "as a most effective 
weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements."37 Moreover, 
the Court expressly noted the "hurdles ... (such as separate suits, 
security for expenses statutes, bringing in all parties necessary for 
complete relief, etc.)" confronting shareholders who seek relief in 
state courts.as The Court's clear preference was that shareholders 
should be afforded the benefits of simplified federal procedure, even 
in contexts not expressly anticipated by Congress. 
Over the next five years, the Court continued to express this ex-
pansive view of the securities laws, providing in Tcherepnin v. 
Knight39 for a widely inclusive reading of the term "security" for 
purposes of protection under the anti-fraud provisions of the Ex-
change Act4o and in SEC v. National Securities41 for the primacy of 
the federal securities law over state insurance regulation in the con-
text of a merger between publicly held insurance companies. 
These cases may have reflected the strong influence on the Court, 
particularly in the area of securities regulation, of Justice William 0. 
Douglas, whose years as the aggressive Chairman of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission had given him a strong enforcement bias, 
and Justice Hugo L. Black, a loyal New Dealer and former plaintiffs' 
36. J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 435 (citations omitted). 
39. 389 u.s. 332 (1967). 
40. At issue was whether withdrawable capital shares in a state-chartered savings 
and loan association were securities under federal law, or whether investors in such 
shares would be limited to state law remedies when alleging fraud in connection with 
the sale of the instruments. /d. at 332. 
41. 393 u.s. 453 (1969). 
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lawyer who looked out for the "little investors" and was wise to the 
ways of corporate managers. 42 They may also have reflected the 
view of Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had made his life in law en-
forcement43 and recognized the value of deputization.44 Soon to 
come, however, was Chief Justice Warren Burger, who had cam-
paigned for his position on a "law and order" platform but whose cre-
dentials as a law enforcement officer were negligible.45 Moreover, 
his commitment to law enforcement was at least equalled by his com-
mitment to other "Republican values," including "free enterprise" 
and the elimination of governmental interference with business. 
B. 1969-1972: Mills, Bankers' Life and Affiliated Ute-The Early 
Burger Court Widens the Welcome 
After the ascendency of Warren Burger to the position of Chief 
Justice and the arrival of Justice Harry Blackmun,46 the Court, 
under the continuing influence of its "securities expert," Justice 
Douglas, at first continued to express an expansive view of share-
holders' private rights of action, and specifically encouraged share-
holders' class actions. This willingness to facilitate federal court 
redress of investor grievances was most vividly displayed during 
Chief Justice Burger's first term in the decision in Mills v. Electric 
Auto-Lite Co.,47 a case which was conceived in the same "strike-suit" 
law offices that had handled the seminal Borak case. 
Mills, like Borak, involved a shareholder challenge to a corporate 
merger. Plaintiffs, shareholders in the Electric Auto-Lite Co., ob-
42. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966) (noting the 
important role of shareholder derivative suits in "protecting shareholders of corpora-
tions from the designing schemes and wiles of insiders who are willing to betray their 
company's interests in order to enrich themselves"). 
43. Following his Army service, Warren joined the staff of the Oakland city attor-
ney in 1919. He then joined the office of the Alameda County prosecutor in 1920, 
where he served until 1938, when he was elected California Attorney General. C. 
BARNES, MEN OF THE SUPREME COURT 153 (1978). 
44. Prior to the chairmanship of William Cary beginning in 1961, the notion of 
"deputization" would have been regarded as curious, given that 'the SEC's own en-
forcement efforts were so tepid. But "[d)uring the three years of Cary's chairmanship, 
the [SEC) initiated approximately as many cases as it had in the previous twenty-six 
years." J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 361 (1982). Under 
Chairman Manuel Cohen, who succeeded Cary, the Commission further expanded its 
enforcement activities. Id. at 361-63. 
45. Burger served two years as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil 
Division of the Justice Department. C. BARNES, supra note 43, at 47. 
46. Warren Burger became Chief Justice on June 23, 1969. Justice Blackmun 
joined the Court on June 9, 1970. 
47. 396 u.s. 375 (1970). 
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jected that the proxy solicitation they had received had misrepre-
sented the facts concerning the recommendation by the Auto-Lite 
Board that the merger be approved.4B Because over fifty percent of 
Auto-Lite's stock was controlled by the proposed merger partner and 
the merger had been approved by a majority of shareholders far ex-
ceeding the necessary two-thirds vote, the defendants urged that, un-
less plaintiffs could prove that the terms of the merger had been 
"unfair," their complaint should be dismissed.49 The Court, in an 
opinion particularly solicitous of the problems of "small sharehold-
ers" seeking to enforce the securities laws,so held that no such show-
ing would be required. All that was required was that plaintiffs show 
that the proxy solicitation sent to them had been "materially 
misleading."sl 
The Court went on to provide that shareholders able to demon-
strate a material misstatement or omission in a proxy statement 
would be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees for having "vindi-
cat[ed] the statutory policy" and "render[ing] a substantial service to 
the corporation and its shareholders."s2 This would be so even if 
plaintiffs could never prove monetary damages.sa Thus, plaintiffs' at-
torneys had a strong incentive to seek out, organize and prosecute ac-
tions on behalf of aggrieved shareholders, even where defendants' 
violations of the securities laws might be characterized as "technical." 
The Court, at this point, was not only tolerant of the possible abuses 
which would result from shareholder vigilantism, but was willing to 
encourage such conduct as a means of more effectively enforcing the 
securities laws. 
The Burger Court's receptivity to the notion of private enforce-
ment of the federal securities laws was again obvious in the 1971 deci-
sion Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.54 
By the time of this decision, Justice Black had died and would soon 
be replaced by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., a long-time corporate de-
fense lawyer.ss Justice Harlan, who authored the Auto-Lite decision, 
had retired and his place remained vacant pending the arrival of his 
replacement, William Rehnquist. Notwithstanding these develop-
ments, which would soon dramatically alter the Court's approach to 
securities cases, the Court's temporarily diminished commitment to 
48. Id. at 377-78, 380. 
49. See id. at 380-83. 
50. See id. at 382. 
51. Id. at 382-86. 
52. Id. at 387-94. 
53. Id. at 394. 
54. 404 u.s. 6 (1971). 
55. Powell served on several corporate boards, and had served as President of the 
American Bar Association, the American Bar Foundation and the American College of 
Trial Lawyers. C. BARNES, supra note 43, at 119. 
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citizen enforcement of the securities laws remained strong. The deci-
sion of the seven member court in Bankers Life favorable to the 
plaintiff was unanimous. 
The facts in Bankers Life have been described as "incredibly com-
plicated,"56 but, when stripped of their diversionary details, were 
rather simple: Manhattan Casualty Co. had been acquired from its 
parent by an investor, Begole, whose intent was "to pay for [the Man-
hattan] stock, not out of [his] own funds, but with Manhattan's as-
sets."57 In the course of a day's hectic dealing, Manhattan's new 
management sold $4.8 million of the company's United States Treas-
ury bonds, and then applied the proceeds to pay off the loan with 
which Begole had purchased Manhattan's shares. Begole's slight of 
hand, which traditionally would have been regarded as simply mana-
gerial misappropriation subject to state court oversight, was said by 
the plaintiff, Manhattan's receiver, also to represent a "manipulative 
or deceptive device or contrivance" uin connection with" Manhattan's 
sale of the government bonds, thus requiring the matter to be heard 
in federal court under section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.58 The receiver's complaint, however, had been dismissed by 
both the district court and a divided panel of the court of appeals, on 
the ground that the receiver had "not made out a claim cognizable 
under the federal Securities Acts,"59 and thus could only seek redress 
in the state courts. Certiorari was granted to consider whether rule 
lOb-5 encompassed transactions such as Begole's and whether the 
misappropriation of the proceeds of the · sale of a security could be 
held to have occurred "in connection with" that sale. 
The Bankers Life decision comprised less than eight pages. It was 
written by the most ardent of the regulatory justices, William 0. 
Douglas. In Justice Douglas's characteristically exuberant prose,6o 
56. L. Loss, FuNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 903 (1983). 
57. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 7. The notion that there is something amiss in this 
goal is curious in an era of leveraged buyouts. 
58. !d. at 9. Section 10(b) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person ... [t]o use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security not so registered, any manipulative or de-
ceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
for the protection of investors. 
15 u.s.c. § 78j(6) (1982). . . 
59. Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 430 F.2d 
355, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1980). 
60. "Douglas always claimed that the work of the Court never took more than 
three or four days a week; he read petitions rapidly, rarely agonized over decisions, 
could get to the heart of an issue instantly, and wrote his opinions quickly." THE 
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the Court first observed that corporate investors such as Manhattan, 
as well as individual investors, were protected by section 10(b).61 
Moreover, such investors were protected whether they traded on an 
organized securities exchange, through the over-the-counter market, 
or otherwise.s2 The absence of an express private right of action in 
section lO(b) was not a disability for investors who had been injured 
by another's misconduct.63 In addition, such investors were pro-
tected under federal law from schemes which "deprived [them] of 
any compensation for the sale of [a] valuable block of securities."64 
This was so even where the schemers responsible for this deprivation 
were the corporation's own executives.ss The Court concluded its 
sweeping exigesis of rule lOb-5 by admonishing: "Section lO(b) must 
be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively. Since there was a 
'sale' of a security and since fraud was used in 'connection' with it, 
there is redress under§ lO(b), whatever might be available as a rem-
edy under state law."66 
Litigants and their counsel were quick to respond to this encourag-
ing vision of rule lOb-5 and its uncompromising message to the lower 
courts that shareholder-initiated claims under the securities laws 
were to be read liberally, and with a rebuttable presumption in favor 
of federal court resolution.s7 
The Burger Court sent a comparable message just a few months 
later in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States.ss This case, 
like Bankers Life, focused on an individual, rather than a class claim, 
arising out of a fact situation not involving the typical "small share-
holder" in the trading markets. At issue was the conduct of tribal ad-
visers in connection with the transfer to white buyers of shares 
which had been restricted to ownership by members of the Ute In-
dian tribe. But Affiliated Ute, like Bankers Life, was important be-
yond its idiosyncratic facts. 
The specific question before the Court was whether a Ute seller of 
securities could maintain a cause of action against a white buyer (or 
his agent) who acquired the seller's shares at $300 per share knowing 
DOUGLAS LETTERS-SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . 
DOUGLAS xvii (Urofsky ed. 1987). Some said his decisions were "'slapdash." Id. at x. 
By the time he joined the Court in 1965, Douglas's friend Abe Fortas concluded that, 
after 25 years on the Court, Douglas had become bored with his judicial work and had 
gotten "sloppy in writing his opinions." B.A. MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF 
A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 214 (1988). 
61. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 10. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 13 n.9. 
64. /d. at 10. 
65. Id. 
66. /d. at 12. 
67. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
68. 406 u.s. 128 (1972). 
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their market value in the white community was in excess of $500 per 
share. The significant question was whether the buyers could defend 
on the ground that they had made no affirmative misstatements of 
fact to the sellers at any time during their dealings. 
In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun-his first in the field of 
federal securities law since coming on the bench in 1970--the Court 
held that where a buyer of stock fails to disclose to the seller in a 
face-to-face transaction material information (such as the prevailing 
market price of the stock), he has failed to fulfill a duty to disclose69 
and positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to the seller's re-
covery under rule lOb-5. "All that is necessary is that the facts with-
held be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have 
considered them important in the making of [an investment] deci-
sion."7o As will be seen, Affiliated Ute had a strong influence on 
later cases well beyond those involving face-to-face transactions,n 
and was a direct antecedent of the Basic decision.72 
Just as Bankers Life was understood to minimize plaintiffs' burden 
in satisfying the "in connection with" requirement of rule lOb-5, Af-
filiated Ute was understood to minimize the reliance/causation ele-
ment of claims brought under the rule. However, perhaps energized 
by the arrival of Justices Rehnquist and Powell (who did not partici-
pate in either decision), the Court soon began to reconsider the impli-
cations of Bankers Life and Affiliated Ute. 
This process of reevaluation involved five separate, although inter-
twining, considerations: 
(1) Concern about and hostility to the increase in federal court filings vs. 
the need to encourage private enforcement of the federal securities laws in or-
der to compensate for the inadequate resources of the SEC. 
(2) Hostility to plaintiff class actions generally, especially those which could 
be characterized as lawyer-motivated "strike suits" vs. approval of the class 
action device as the only feasible way for plaintiffs with a small stake in the 
enterprise to protect themselves against improper conduct which results in 
large damages spread among thousands of people. 
(3) Hostility to "overregulation" and "harassment" of businesses and their 
managers vs. the need to protect shareholders (and others who deal with busi-
ness) from overreaching. 
( 4) Resistance to the "federalization" of corporate law and the parallel de-
sire to leave to the state courts disputes traditionally resolved there vs. defer-
69. The decision does not specifically articulate the source of this "duty," an issue 
which only later became significant in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
See id. at 231-32. 
70. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S at 153-54. 
71. See infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
72. See infra notes 228-32 and accompanying text. 
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ence to the regulatory expertise of the SEC and federal courts in resolving 
disputes under federal law. 
(5) A commitment to strict statutory construction vs. a desire to effectuate 
the intended goals of the statute writers. , 
For clarity, throughout the balance of this paper, I have designated 
these considerations respectively "caseload," "class action access," 
"managerial prerogative," "federalism," and "statutory integrity." 
The need to balance and resolve the competing values embodied in 
these considerations, essentially invisible in the Warren era decisions, 
came more and more to dominate the Burger Court's decisions in 
cases involving the securities laws. 
C 1972-197~The Slow Beginning of a Long Retreat 
Two cas~s decided during the period 1972-1975, which seemed to-
tally unrelated to the rule 10b-5 issues examined in Bankers Life and 
Affiliated Ute, set the tone for that which was to come. Both cases 
limited the scope of section 16(b) of the Exchange Act,73 which had 
bEren enacted to permit shareholders to require disgorgement to the 
corporate treasury of "short-swing" trading profits gained by corpo-
rate executives and persons who were ten percent shareholders at 
the t~me of both the purchase and the sale. In Reliance Electric Co. 
v. Emerson Electric Co.,74 the Court held that a speculator which had 
acquired 13.2% ownership of a company through a tender offer and 
within six months had sold off its shares in sequential sales repre-
senting 3.24% and then 9.96%, would be liable only for the profits on 
its first sale, inasmuch as, at the time of the second sale, the specula-
tor was no longer a 10% shareholder of the target so was not gov-
erned by section 16(b).75 This sell-off scheme, which had been 
devised by the speculator's general counsel, had as its clear intent the 
evasion of section 16(b)'s coverage; but the Court in a 4-3 decision 
written by Justice Stewart76 chose, quite contrary to the spirit of 
Bankers Life, to read the statute "technically and restrictively," and 
immunized from shareholder recovery any profits not strictly within 
section 16(b)'s purview. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices White 
and Brennan, predictably dissented, arguing that the majority's posi-
tion "undermine[d]" the purposes of the statute,77 and was "plainly 
at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole."78 
In this decision we can see the first stirrings of what I have desig-
nated as the "statutory integrity" issue of the debate which was to 
73. 15 u.s.c. § 78 (1982). 
74. 404 u.s. 418 (1972). 
75. Id. at 422-27. 
76. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in this case. 
77. Reliance, 404 U.S. at 431 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
78. Id. (quoting U.S. v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534-43 (1939)). 
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mature over the next decade, with the conservative justices generally 
favoring a narrow "plain language" approach and the more liberal 
justices favoring a broader and more instrumental approach to statu-
tory interpretation. 
The followi~g year, the Court again narrowed the scope of sect~on 
16(b). In Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,79 Oc-
cidental had, by means of a public tender offer, acquired more than 
ten percent of the shares of Kern County Land Co. ("Old Kern"). 
Old Kern had aggressively resisted Occidental's takeover attempt, 
and entered into a defensive merger with Tenneco, Inc. Recognizing 
that, following the Old Kern-Tenneco merger, Occideptal would end 
up owning a significant minority position in Tenneco (which it did 
not wish to own), Occidental entered into an option agreement by 
which Tenneco could re-purchase Occidental's Tenneco stock six 
months and one day after the expiration of Occidental's tender offer. 
Tenneco made a down payment of $8.8 million for the option against 
the full $84.2 million purchase price while the six-month waiting pe-
riod was still running. ·The question before the Court was whether 
either the merger itself (by which Occidental traded its Old Kern for 
Tenneco shares) or the execution of the buy-back option agreement 
with Tenneco, constituted a "sale" subject to regulation under section 
16(b). 
This time the Court (now joined by Justices Powell and Rehn-
quist), in an opinion by Justice White, applied a "pragmatic" rather 
than a strict constructionist approach, holding that neither transac-
tion was a "sale,"so and that section 16(b) ought not to apply because 
at no time during the running of the six-month period did Occidental 
have access to inside information or the opportunity to engage in 
"speculative abuse."Sl Justice Douglas (this time joined by Justices 
Brennan and Stewart) again dissented on the ground that the Court's 
manipulation of section 16(b) undermined Congress's intent to dis-
courage insider trading.s2 Ironically,. now it was the liberals who 
were urging the more literal reading of the statute and the conserva-
tives who professed to be serving Congress's "real" goals. However, 
the focus of the analysis had shifted in Kern County from one merely 
of statutory intent to one of business realities. Justice White's opin-
ion in Kern County was comprised almost entirely of a detailed "real 
79. 411 u.s. 582 (1973). 
80. Id. at 603-04. 
81. Id. at 599. 
82. ld. at 605 (Douglas, J ., dissenting). 
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world" analysis of how business information was acquired by (or con-
cealed from) Occidental and how corporate decisions are made.sa 
Thus, another thread of the debate-that relating to managerial pre-
rogatives-began to emerge, in which t:he conservative members of 
the Court demonstrated an acute appreciation of the problems faced 
by corporate managers and a willingness to resolve substantive law 
questions so as to relieve them of liability when their wrongdoing 
was not manifest. 
The combined consequence of the Reliance and Kern County cases 
was to deprive shareholders of the corporations, in whose stock prof-
itable short-swing trading had occurred, of millions of dollars in dam-
ages and a fair assessment of attorneys' fees. Other decisions during 
this period also reflected an increasingly restrictive view of the sorts 
of securities-related claims which should be heard in the federal 
courts,84 or the sorts of plaintiffs who ought to be able to advance 
federal court claims.ss The vote was routinely 5-4, with Justices 
Douglas and Brennan always in the minority and Justices Marshall, 
Blackmun, and White variously making up the remaining twosome.B6 
But the clearest sign of the Court's antipathy to investors and their 
use of federal courts to resolve differences with corporate managers 
would come in the provocative language of Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores,B7 issued at the close of the term in 1975. 
Less than four years had passed since the· unanimous decision in 
Bankers Life. Only three had passed since Affiliated Ute. However, 
th~ atmosphere of the Court had changed substantially in the in-
terim. Justice Douglas, the champion of the shareholder, had become 
incapacitated and would soon resign to be replaced by a corporate 
83. /d. at 598-99. 
84. E.g., Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703 
(1974) (corporation cannot recover from its former 98.3% owner for alleged violations 
of federal securities laws and related state laws during the term of ownership) (Jus-
tices Marshall, Douglas, Brennan, and White disssented); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 
Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (corporation asserting violations of rule lOb-5 is bound by 
agreement previously executed with defendant to arbitrate any dispute arising out of 
the agreement in the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France) (Justices 
Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented). 
85. E.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (bro-
kerage customers have no implied private right of action under the Securities Investor 
Protection Act of 1970); Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416 (1972) 
(trustee in reorganization lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of a corporation's 
bondholders alleging breach of fiduciary duty by the corporation's indenture trustee) 
(Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Blackmun dissented). See also Eisen v. Car-
lisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Eisen was a case of enormous significance, hold-
ing that a representative plaintiff in a. rule 23(c)(2) class action was required to send 
individual opt-out notices to all class members-estimated to number over two million 
"odd-lot" traders in securities-and to bear the cost of doing so or else see the case 
dismissed. (Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented). 
86. See supra notes 84-85. 
87. 421 u.s. 723 (1975). 
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lawyer with predictably different sympathies.ss Not only was Justice 
Douglas no longer an influential voice on the Court, his views were 
now cancelled out by the far more management-protective instincts 
of Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Moreover, Justice Rehnquist had 
by now assumed his role as adjutant in Chief Justice Burger's cam-
paign to reduce federal court caseloads.s9 The Court was beginning 
to systematically eliminate whole portions of the federal court 
docket,9o especially targeting class action plaintiffs91 and plaintiffs as-
serting implied private rights of action.92 The "new" Burger Court 
was at last prepared to voice its new view of securities law enforce-
ment. That voice was heard in Blue Chip. 
D. 1975-1979: The Court Condemns "Strike-Suiters" 
Plaintiffs in Blue Chip were retail store owners, who had for years 
participated in the Blue Chip trading stamp program. Under the 
terms of an antitrust consent decree, plaintiffs became entitled to 
purchase common stock and debentures in a newly-organized corpo-
ration known as Blue Chip Stamps. Upon review of the Blue Chip 
prospectus, which they later alleged to have been "materially mis-
leading in its overly pessimistic appraisal of Blue Chip's status and 
future prospects,"93 plaintiffs elected not to purchase the offered se-
curities. When the value of the shares later rose, plaintiffs, suing on 
behalf of a class of non-purchasers, sought $21.4 million for lost 
opportunity. 
88. Justice Douglas suffered a stroke in December 1974. Although he returned to 
the Court in late March 1975, he was by then physically wasted and in constant pain. 
He finally and reluctantly submitted his resignation from the Court in November 1975 
and was replaced by Justice John Paul Stevens in December 1975. That Justice 
Stevens later did not meet some conservatives' expectations is one of the recurring 
quirks of Supreme Court history. But see L. Tribe, The Myth of the Surpiised Presi-
dent, in Goo SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985). 
89. E.g., Rehnquist, Whither the Courts, 60 A.B.A. J. 787 (July 1974). Justice 
Rehnquist commented, 
I am frequently asked whether the Supreme Court is overworked. My answer 
is that it is indeed overworked and that the nine members of the Court are 
expected to do more than nine normally capable and diligent judges can be 
expected to do and do in a professionally competent way. 
Compare W. DOUGLAS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS: THE COURT 
YEARS 385 (1980) (notion that the Court was overworked "was insane"). 
90. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (state prison inmates may 
not proceed under federal civil rights laws in challenging denial of "good time" but are 
limited to seeking habeas corpus, which requires exhaustion of state remedies). 
91. See supra note 15. 
92. See supra notes 14 and 85 (discussing Barbour). 
93. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 726. 
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It would have been no surprise if the Court had merely upheld as 
matter of statutory construction the long-honored "Birnbaum rule," 
limiting standing in rule lOb-5 cases to actual purchasers and sellers 
of securities.94 In fact, the Court did just that and ordered plaintiffs' 
complaint dismissed.95 However, part III of the Court's opinion, 
which was written by Justice Rehnquist, proceeded much further 
into the "policy considerations" favoring a restrictive interpretation 
of rule lOb-5.96 Describing the rule contemptuously as "a judicial oak 
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn,"97 Justice 
Rehnquist went on to cast aspersions on shareholder litigants gener-
ally. "There has been widespread recognition," he began, "that litiga-
tion under rule lOb-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in 
degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in gen-
eral. "98 This perception was based on the notion that, because of the 
huge damage awards and liberal use of federal discovery rules which 
were possible in actions brought under rule lOb-5, many such suits-
particularly those brought as class actions and characterized in any 
event as "nuisance" or "strike" suits99-were commonly brought 
solely for their settlement potential.IOO "The prospect of extensive 
deposition of the defendant's officers and associates and the concomi-
tant opportunity for extensive discovery of business documents, is a 
common occurrence in this and similar types of litigation,"tot noted 
Justice Rehnquist (without citation) in a candid expression of his 
concern for the prerogatives of corporate managers. He expressed 
particular concern that corporations be spared "disruption of [their] 
normal business activities"to2 due to shareholders' actions. 
Moreover, he noted that expanding the class of plaintiffs entitled 
to pursue relief under rule lOb-5, to those who had foreborne from 
purchasing (or selling) shares, would encourage hindsight-aided testi-
mony by the risk averse who had failed to trade.toa What the opinion 
left unstated was that litigating shareholders, presumably guided by 
their "strike suit" lawyers, are prone to falsify their testimony. This 
represented yet another thread of the Supreme Court debate, focus-
ing on the conservative mistrust of class activists. 
One obvious reading of the Blue Chip decision is that its intention 
94. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 
u.s. 956 (1952). 
95: Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731. 
96. I d. at 737-49. 
97. Id. at 737. 
98. /d. at 739-40. 
99. Id. at 740. 
100. Id. at 741. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 742-43. 
103. Id. at 746-47. 
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was not only to facilitate the quick dismissal of securities-related 
lawsuits brought by non-buyers or sellers, but also to signal the dis-
trict courts to hear with more caution the more traditional suits 
which remained. Justice Rehnquist did nothing to dispel such a con-
clusion when he ended his comments with the gratuitous observation 
that "we are not the first court to express concern that the inexora-
ble broadening of the class of plaintiff who may sue in this area of 
the law will ultimately result in more harm than good."l04 
Enter Justice Harry Blackmun, who at the time of Blue Chip was 
about to inherit the mantle of Justice Douglas as the Court's most 
outspoken protector of the "little investor." Justice Blackmun, in a 
vigorous dissent joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, felt that 
the "harm" which Justice Rehnquist sought to protect against was 
nothing more than the discomfort of corporate executives and the 
possibility of intensive federal court scrutiny of their manipulative 
behavior. "[T]he Court exhibits a preternatural solicitousness for 
corporate well-being," he scolded, "and a seeming callousness toward 
the investing public quite out of keeping it seems to me, with our 
own traditions and the intent of the securities laws."1os This was not 
the first time Justice Blackmun had stood up for the small investor 
seeking relief in the federal court.1oo And it would not be the last 
time he challenged the Court's new paternalism toward corporate 
man~gers.l07 
The conservative majority's disdain for federal court shareholder 
claims, particularly those brought as class actions, continued to 
emerge in Supreme Court decisions, arising next in Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochjelder.1os This case considered the question of whether "scien-
ter" or a specific "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud"l09 was 
an essential element of private claims brought by shareholders under 
rule 10b-5. Though the Securities and Exchange Commission argued 
that it was not,no the Court in an opinion written by Justice Powell 
held to the contrary.1n The focus of t~e majority was on strict statu-
104. Id. at 747-48. 
105. Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing inter alia Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 
12). 
106. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 128; supra notes 
65-69 and accompanying text. 
107. See infra notes 117, 210-11 and accompanying text. 
108. 425 u.s. 185 (1976). 
109. !d. at 187-88. 
110. !d. at 197-98. 
111. Id. at 214. 
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tory construction, with ready reference to dictionary definitions to 
reach the plain meaning of the statute.l12 
One point in support of the Court's conclusion that scienter was re-
quired in rule 10b-5 actions was the observation that if plaintiffs were 
excused from proving scienter in claims brought under rule 10b-5, 
then no one would ever utilize the express but more limited share-
holder recovery provisions of the 1933 Act.ua These provisions-
which did not require proof of scienter-were subject to various pro-
cedural restrictions not applicable to rule 10b-5, which had been im-
posed by Congress, Justice Powell observed, in part "to deter actions 
brought solely for their potential settlement value."114 
The implicit message was that to freely permit rule 10b-5 claims 
without requiring plaintiffs to show scienter on the part of the de-
fendant would encourage precisely the sort of shareholder "strike 
suits" which Blue Chip had attempted to discourage. This implica-
tion was buttressed by the Court's specific recognition that rule lOb-5 
claims in the absence of scienter "would significantly broaden the 
class of plaintiffs who may seek to impose liability upon accountants 
and other experts who perform services or express opinions with re-
spect to matters under the Acts."ll5 As had clearly been seen in the 
Blue Chip decision, where the Court refused to expand the class of 
rule 10b-5 plaintiffs empowered to sue primary violators, this was not 
a result to be sanctioned by the Burger Court. The articulation of 
this desire to keep to a minimum acceptable categories of rule 10b-5 
plaintiffs was a direct manifestation not only of the Court's antipathy 
to "strike suits" but also of the more general "caseload" concerns of 
the conservative majority. Justice Blackmun once again authored 
the dissent,ns emphasizing the majority's disregard of the needs of 
shareholders victimized by managerial misconduct.n7 
Other cases during this period reinforced the exclusionary message 
of Blue Chip and Hochfelder. In particular, in TSC Industries, Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc.,us the Court escalated the standard of materiality 
which must be proven by a shareholder in an action brought under 
the federal proxy solicitation rules.ll9 In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus-
112. !d. at 199 n.20-21. 
113. !d. at 210-11. 
114. !d. at 210-11 n.30. 
115. ld. at 214 n.33. 
116. !d. at 215. Only Justice Brennan joined in this dissent. It should be noted that 
Justice Douglas had already resigned when this decision was rendered. 
117. "Once again ... the Court interprets § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
... restrictively and narrowly and thereby stultifies recovery for the victim." ld. at 
215-16 (Blackmun, J ., dissenting). 
118. 426 u.s. 438 (1976). 
119. !d. at 449. 
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tries, Inc.,12o the Court held that a tender offeror, even one holding 
. 
over 500,000 shares in the target company, lacks standing to seek 
damages for violations by a competing offeror of the disclosure provi-
sions of the federal tender offer rules, notwithstanding that the for-
mer may be the best situated plaintiff (in terms of incentive and 
financial resources) to pursue such claims.121 The decisions in TSC 
and Piper, like those in Blue Chip and Hochfelder, were contrary to 
the expressed views of the SEC, which argued in Piper that a more 
receptive attitude toward private rights of action was necessary to en-
sure optimal enforcement of the federal securities laws.122 Presuma-
bly, that was no longer an objective of a majority of this Court. 
Another major case in the Court's exclusionary campaign was 
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,123 which considered the applica-
tion of rule lOb-5 to "short-form" or "squeeze-out" mergers author-
ized under Delaware law. The Second Circuit had held that when 
such transactions represented a breach of fiduciary duty by a major-
ity against minority shareholders, they were governed by the "arti-
fice to defraud" provisions of rule lOb-5, even where there had been 
no material misstatements or omissions in any shareholder communi-
cations.l24 The Supreme Court reversed, relying on the strict con-
structionist approach of Hochfelder, and held that rule lOb-5 does not 
apply to "instances of corporate mismanagement such as this, in 
which the essence of the complaint is that shareholders were treated 
unfairly by a fiduciary."125 Rather, actions under rule lOb-5 should 
be restricted to conduct involving manipulation or deception.126 
The opinion was written this time by Justice White, and rang a fa-
miliar note in light of the cases which had gone before. The Court 
focused on the "plain meaning" of the statute's language.127 There 
was also a reprise of the Court's apprehensions about interference 
with mangerial prerogatives. The Court noted that to permit plain-
tiff's complaint to proceed would pose a "danger of vexatious litiga-
tion which could result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs 
120. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). (Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion concurring in 
the judgment; Justices Brennan and Stevens dissented.). 
121. /d. at 45-46. 
122. Id. at 64 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). 
123. 430 u.s. 462 (1977). 
124. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (1976). 
125. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 477. 
126. /d. at 473-74. 
127. /d. at 472. 
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under Rule lOb-5."128 
The Court also noted that hearing complaints such as Green's 
would interfere with the traditional state regulation of matters relat-
ing to corporate governance.129 Thus was raised the final item on 
the Court's agenda of considerations, the federalism issue. Quite 
contrary to the expressed preference in Bankers Life for federal 
court resolution of claims "whatever might be available as a remedy 
under state law,"130 the Court's preference had now shifted to state 
court resolution of shareholder disputes wherever possible. 
Although Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurred in the judg-
ment in Santa Fe, they declined to adopt the rhetoric of part IV of 
the Court's opinion which related to the "[policy] considerations that 
weigh heavily against permitting a cause of action under rule 10b-5 
for the breach of corporate fiduciary duty."131 Instead, Justice Black-
mun referred to his dissents in Blue Chip and Hoc}ifelder and Justice 
Stevens referred to his dissent in Piper, in which they both cautioned 
against the emasculation of the federal securities laws.1a2 Justice 
Brennan dissented from the judgment in Santa Fe.1aa 
Taken together, by 1977, Blue Chip, Hochfelder, and Santa Fe had 
resolved all five of the Court's agenda items--caseload, class action 
access, managerial prerogative, federalism and statutory integrity-in 
favor of the conservative view. While the Court had not overruled 
the fundamental principle that an implied private right of action ex-
ists to enforce rule lOb-5,134 it had clearly signalled that such actions 
were no longer favored, and that continuing efforts to expand the 
scope of rule 10b-5 were unlikely to succeed. 
For the remainder of the period 1975-1979, the "new majority" of 
the Burger Court repeatedly conveyed the message that the era of of 
solicitude toward shareholders was over;135 so too was any thought 
128. ld. at 478-79 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 
740 (1975)). 
129. Id. at 478. 
130. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 604 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). 
131. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 477. 
132. Id. at 480-81. 
133. Id. at 480 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
134. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196. 
135. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) ("disinterested" directors of an in-
vestment company may terminate a "non-frivolous" shareholders' derivative suit 
brought against other directors under the Investment Company Act); International 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (limiting the definition of "security" 
under both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act); Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (brokerage firm's clients have no implied private right 
of action under section 17(a) of the 1934 Act against firm's accountants for facilitating 
the filing of false reports with the SEC) (Justice Marshall dissented); Transamerica 
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (shareholders have no implied pri-
vate right of action to seek damages under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
although they do have standing to seek rescission of an advisor's contract) (Justices 
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that the views of the SEC necessarily had persuasive authority before 
the Court.136 The SEC had advanced on its own behalf, or as amicus 
curiae, unsuccessful arguments in Blue Chip,137 Hoch/elder,138 Santa 
Fe,139 Northway,140 Piper,141 Forman,l42, Cort,143 United States v. 
White, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 
U.S. 463 (1978) (denial of class certification in an action brought by securities purchas-
ers was not an appealable order); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 
(1978) (investors in an action challenging conduct of an open-end diversified invest-
ment fund must bear total cost of assembling from defendant's records a mailing list of 
class members); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 10.3 (1978) (SEC has no authority to suspend 
indefinitely trading in exchange traded shares); Foremost-McKesson v. Provident Se-
curities Co., 422 U.S. 232 (1976) (limiting coverage of section 16(b) "short-swing" provi-
sion); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976) (national bank sued for 
violation of federal securities laws is subject only to the limited venue provision of the 
National Bank Act and not the more inclusive provision of the Securities Exchange 
Act) (Stevens dissented); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (requir-
ing corporate plaintiff to make traditional showing of irreparable harm to support re-
quest for injunctive relief against purchaser in "technical default" of schedule 13D 
filing requirement) (Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented); United Hous-
ing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (excluding non-"traditional" shares 
of stock from coverage under the federal securities laws) (Justices Brennan, Douglas, 
and White dissented); see also Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 
(1979) (constitutional challenge to state anti-takeover law may be heard only in the 
state in which law has been enacted) (Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall dis-
sented); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978) (federal court may stay claim 
under securities law-over which it has exclusive jurisdiction-where related state ac-
tion is pending) (Justices Burger, Brennan, Marshall, and Powell dissented); Cort v. 
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (shareholders have no implied private right of action under 
criminal statute prohibiting corporate contributions to presidential candidates); 
Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975) (shareholders' challenge to 
fixed commission rates of Exchange member firms dismissed on grounds of antitrust 
immunity); United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975) (SEC-
regulated marketing practices of open-end mutual funds immune from coverage of fed-
eral antitrust laws) (White, Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissented). 
But see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (defendants in a share-
holders' class action are collaterally estopped from relitigating questions of liability 
previously decided adversely to them in non-jury trial arising out of an SEC enforce-
ment action, and this application does not violate the seventh amendment right to jury 
trial); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm., 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (state cannot tax 
stock transfers which occur out-of-state at a higher rate than those which occur in 
state). 
136. One commentator has observed that, during this same period in antitrust 
cases, the Court's rule of thumb had changed from "the government always wins" to 
"the government always loses." R. GALLOWAY, THE RICH AND THE POOR IN SUPREME 
COURT HISTORY 174-75 (1982). 
137. 421 u.s. 723 (1975). 
138. 425 u.s. 185 (1976). 
139. 430 u.s. 462 (1977). 
140. 426 u.s. 438 (1976). 
141. 430 u.s. 1 (1977). 
142. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
143. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
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Leroy,1so and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors.151 And the worst 
was yet to come with the advent of the new decade and the Court's 
dismemberment of the SEC's insider trading theories.1s2 
Though federal court solicitude toward shareholder grievances had 
declined, the opportunity for abuse of shareholders in the financial 
markets had not. Instead this opportunity for abuse actually in-
creased. Initial public offerings increased in number and value 
throughout the 1980's.153 Trading volume increased as well,154 as did 
takeover activity,1ss attendant price volatility,156 and sales of new fi-
nancial "products," all of which presented opportunities for fraudu-
lent activity in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 
With this increased economic activity came new pressures on the fed-
eral courts to hear and resolve shareholder grievances. 
E. 1980-1987: A New Reception for a Limited Class of Shareholders 
During the 1980's, the Court continued to transmit subtle and not-
so-subtle messages designed to chill the litigating ardor of sharehold-
ers.157 This was especially evident in the Court's decisions compel-
ling the enforcement of arbitration agreements where customers 
filed complaints against their brokers.1ss These decisions reflected 
144. United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975). 
145. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975). 
146. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 103 (1978). 
147. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978). 
148. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979). 
149. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). 
150. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). 
151. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). 
152. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (conviction of insider trader 
based upon the "misappropriation" theory upheld by a bare 4-4 vote); Dirks v. SEC, 
463 U.S. 646 (1983) (SEC censure of investment analyst who passed along tips to cus-
tomers reversed where analyst had merely received information from a corporate in-
sider and the tipper had violated no duty of non-disclosure) (Justices Blackmun, 
Brennan, and Marshall dissented); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) 
(criminal conviction of defendant who traded on the basis of material non-public infor-
mation is reversed because he owed no duty of disclosure to the trading public) (Jus-
tices Burger, Blackmun, and Marshall dissented). 
153. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT, Table 25 (1987) The 
number of registration statements grew from 3402 in fiscal year 1980 to 5925 in fiscal 
year 1986 while the value of public offerings grew from $110,583,000,000 to 
$484,383,000,000 during that same period. 
154. /d. at Table 18 (showing exchange-traded share volume in fiscal year 1980 of 
15,586,986,000 shares and in fiscal year 1986 of 48,580,524,000 shares). 
155. Completed mergers increased in value from $32.9 billion in 1980 to $190.5 bil-
lion in 1986. MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS ALMANAC (1987). 
156. See Big Board Votes to Curb Some Program Trades, WALL ST. J ., Feb. 5, 1988, 
at 1, col. 1. The Dow Jones Industrial Average moved more than 50 points in a day 26 
times between January 1986 and January 1988. /d. 
157. See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text. 
158. See, e.g., Shearson/ American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) 
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the conservative majority's continuing view that the grievances of 
small shareholders, whether against their financial advisors or 
against corporate managers, are better heard elsewhere than in a fed-
eral forum.159 
At the same time, there was a small boomlet of decisions which 
seemed to liberalize the scope of the federal securities laws, enhance 
their utility for private plaintiffs, and create new opportunities for 
shareholder recovery.16o For example, the Court in 1981 gave a 
broad interpretation to the statutory term "offer or sale."161 The fol-
lowing year, the Court held that investors in futures contracts could 
maintain an implied private action for damages under the Commod-
ity Exchange Act,l62 and that a paradigm ("first-generation") state 
anti-takeover statute, the clear purpose of which was to impede cash 
tender offers reflecting substantial profit for shareholders, was un-
constitutional, at least in limited respects.163 
(brokerage customers who have signed predispute arbitration agreements may be com-
pelled to arbitrate their Exchange Act claims as well as RICO claims) (Justices Black-
mun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented in part); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. 
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (shareholder alleging violations of the Exchange Act together 
with pendent state claims may be compelled to arbitrate the state-law claims, notwith-
standing their similarity to federal claims and the resultant inefficiency of multiple 
hearings) (unanimous decision); see also Zosky v. Boyer, 109 S. Ct. 868 (1989) (denying 
certiorari on question whether a district court order compelling arbitration in a securi-
ties fraud case is an appealable final order). 
159. Justice Blackmun predicted that the decisions compelling the enforcement of 
predispute arbitration agreements, "no doubt animated by [the Court's) desire to rid 
the federal courts of these [shareholder] suits," actually may increase federal court liti-
gation. Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
160. The Court also (and contrary to its posture in the insider trading cases) 
strengthened the power of the SEC in ruling that the agency had no obligation to no-
tify targets of nonpublic investigations prior to issuing third party subpoenas. SEC v. 
Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735 (1984). The Court also ruled that adjudicatory find-
ings by the Commission were subject only to a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
of proof. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981). However, in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 
(1980), the Court held that the SEC, like a private litigant, must show scienter in order 
to prevail in a claim under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and section 17(a)(1) of 
the Securities Act. Id. at 695, 697 (Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dis-
sented in part). 
161. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981) (pledge of stock to bank as collat-
eral for loan held to be offer or sale). Application of this term to a pledge of stock was 
not surprising, nor did it have anything to do with the rights of shareholders. The case 
involved criminal charges against a corporate official who had participated in the sub-
mission of false financial statements to an institutional lender. Id. at 426-27. 
162. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (Justices 
Powell, Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connor dissented). 
163. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). Much of MITE's influence was un-
done by the Court's later decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 
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In a particularly receptive 1983 decision, Herman & MacLean v. 
Huddleston,164 the Court ruled that plaintiffs may pursue implied 
claims under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, notwithstanding 
overlapping express provisions of the Securities Act.165 Moreover, 
section 10(b) claims need only be proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence, rather than to the clear-and-convincing standard applied by 
many jurisdictions in common law fraud cases.166 
Two decisions issued in 1985, and both appeared to further expand 
the private use of rule 10b-5 beyond its previous boundaries. In Bate-
man Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner,167 a unanimous opinion 
authored by Justice Brennan, the Court ruled that an investor who 
alleges he has been deluded by a "tipper" into believing that he is 
trading on the basis of inside information when he is not, may main-
tain a cause of action against the tipper under rule lOb-5; he is not 
automatically subject to dismissal under the doctrine of in pari 
delicto.16B The rationale for this decision was that "denying the in 
pari delicto defense . . . will best promote the primary objective of 
the federal securities laws-protection of the investing public and the 
national economy . .. ,"169 The Court took particular note of the need 
to facilitate private enforcement of the securities laws in light of the 
inadequacy of the SEC's resources,170 a position last considered favor-
ably by the Court in Borak,111 and one which in the interim had re-
ceived a cold response in Piper.172 
The decision in Bateman, Eichler was not likely to have a signifi-
cant impact on federal court dockets, given that few investors would 
be inclined to pursue claims where there was a substantial likelihood 
that their own violations of the law would be exposed. Moreover, the 
decision provided little, if any, practical value to shareholders suing 
in the class action context. A more important decision was Landreth 
(1987), which upheld as constitutional a "second-generation" anti-takeover statute. See 
infra note 189 and accompanying text. 
164. 459 u.s. 375 (1983). 
165. !d. at 387. 
166. /d. at 390. 
167. 472 u.s. 299 (1985). 
168. /d. at 312. 
169. /d. at 315. 
170. /d. 
171. 377 u.s. 426, 432-33 (1964). 
172. 430 U.S. 1, 42~43 (1976). The notion that routine use of the in pari delicto de-
fense would thwart an important means of law enforcement was reenforced in the 
Court's decision in Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063 (1988). There, Justice Blackmun, 
writing for the Court, noted that the defense should only be available where its use 
would not "significantly interfere with the effective enforcement of the securities laws 
and protection of the investing public." /d. at 2071 (quoting Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. 
at 310-11). He specifically noted that "in many instances a private suit is the only ef-
fective means of detecting and deterring a seller's [violation of the securities laws]." 
/d. at 2074. 
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Timber Co. v. Landreth,173 in which the Court abolished the "sale-of-
business" defense to rule 10b-5 actions, and held, contrary to the view 
shared by many commentators and courts of appeals,174 that an in-
vestor who buys 100% of a closely-held business, by acquiring its 
shares, is entitled to the protection of the federal securities laws and 
may pursue claims of fraud in federal court in connection with the 
purchase.175 The same holds true for the investor who acquires less 
than 100% of a closely-held business, with the intention of actively 
participating in its management.176 It would not have been surpris-
ing had the Burger Court, having added an additional conservative 
member,177 chosen to narrowly read rule 10b-5 to exclude such trans-
actions from the coverage of federal law, on the ground that the 
problems presented in sale-of-business cases had traditionally been 
relegated to state court resolution.178 For conservatives on the Court, 
Landreth created an additional dilemma between its desire to limit 
the scope of private actions under the securities laws and its reluc-
tance to interpret a statute inconsistent with its "plain language." 
Surprisingly, statutory construction won the day.179 In an opinion 
written by Justice Powell, the Court construed the statutory term 
"security," and its subsidiary definition "stock," to encompass sales of 
businesses effectuated by the transfer of "stock." "Although we rec-
ognize that Congress did not intend to provide a comprehensive fed-
eral remedy for all fraud," Justice Powell wrote, "we think it would 
improperly narrow Congress' [sic] broad definition of 'security' to 
hold that the traditional stock at issue here falls outside the Acts' 
coverage.''ISO 
The defendants in Landreth tried to appeal to the conservative ma-
jority's instincts. For example, they unsuccessfully urged the Court 
173. 471 u.s. 681 (1985). 
174. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1351-52 & nn.2-10 (9th 
Cir. 1984). 
175. Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 696-97. 
176. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985) (Stevens dissented). 
177. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined the Court on September 25, 1981, replac-
ing Justice Stewart. 
178. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text. 
179. A similar dilemma faced the Court at about the same time in the civil RICO 
cases, with the same result. Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 503 (1985) (Justices 
Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell dissented). 
180.' Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 687-88. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that 
section 10(b) should be limited to transactions involving "(i) the sale of a security that 
is traded in a public market; or (ii) an investor who is not in a position to negotiate 
appropriate contractual warranties and to insist on access to inside information before 
consummating the transaction." /d. at 699 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). 
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to consider the "economic reality" of the transaction, suggesting that 
the plaintiff . "was not a passive investor of the kind Congress in-
tended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur."lBl The 
Court declined to engage in economic analysis, even though it had 
done so in other cases,1s2 because the plaintiff had acquired "stock" 
rather than some more amorphous form of interest.183 By now, the 
Court was rooted in the language of the statute, notwithstanding 
what Congress may have had in mind. 
The defendants also argued that abandoning the sale-of-business 
doctrine would "increase the workload of the federal courts."l84 Un-
persuaded, the Court noted that application of the doctrine often re-
quired a fact-finding process (involving whether or not the acquirer 
had transferred "control") which would be unnecessary under its rul-
ing.lss Moreover, the Court implied that, by eliminating ex ante un-
certainty in business transactions with respect to the "control" issue, 
its decision would facilitate such transactions and reduce their 
costs.1ss 
Landreth, unlike Bateman Eichler, had the potential for substan-
tial impact on the federal courts. Thousands of businesses change 
hands each year, often later spurring buyer's remorse. With the fed-
eral securities laws now deemed to cover many such transactions, it 
was fair to assume that many corporate acquirers would soon resort 
to the federal courts for resolution of their claims. But Landreth 
hardly represented a reversion to the expansive view of rule 10b-5 
characteristic of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The interests of a cor-
porate acquirer in recovering from its seller are quite different from 
the interests of thousands of small shareholders in recovering from a 
corporation in which they have invested. Certainly the logistical de-
mands on the court are less. More important to the Burger Court, 
Landreth-type actions pose no risk of extracting from the defendant 
a large settlement, often expressed principally in attorneys' fees, paid 
primarily to avoid the costs and disruption attendant to defending the 
case, and frequently disproprortionate to the true merits of the plain-
tiff's complaint. These settlements do little to interfere with the de-
fendant's ongoing business operations (those operations having been 
sold to the plaintiff). 
In short, with the exception of Huddleston and possibly Randall v. 
181. 471 U.S. at 687-88. 
182. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (looking at the economic 
reality, rather than the form, of a transaction determines whether an "investment con-
tract" is involved). 
183. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 690-91. 
184. /d. at 696. 
185. /d. at 696-97. 
186. /d. 
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Loftsgaarden,187 the "pro-plaintiff" decisions of the 1980's were not 
"pro-shareholder" decisions, insofar as that term contemplates the 
"typical" small investor acting as a class representative. Moreover, in 
addition to the arbitration cases,1ss there was another group of deci-
sions during this period decidedly adverse to the needs of the private 
investor. The Court accepted in 1987 a "second-generation" state 
anti-takeover statute,189 which, like all such statutes, was decidedly 
pro-management in orientation and arguably adverse to shareholder 
interests.190 There was also the Court's exclusionary treatment of 
federally-protected tender offerees when a tender offer is termi-
nated.191 With strong implications for individual shareholders (who 
are the "victims" of insider trading but whose interests were not at 
issue in the cases before the Court), the Court very narrowly inter-
preted the scope of rule 10b-5 in the context of insider trading.192 
The Burger Court revived its tradition of strictly construing the juris-
dictional term "security."193 The Rehnquist Court perpetuated this 
tradition by narrowly construing the statutory definition of a 
"seller."194 
The composition of the Court in these "anti-shareholder" decisions 
is especially telling, but hardly surprising. The 1970s had already 
seen Justices Blackmun and Brennan taking up the cause of the 
small shareholder and dissenting regularly in securities cases.195 
187. 478 U.S. 647 (1986) (plaintiffs entitled to rescission not offset by any tax bene-
fits enjoyed by them during the period of ownership in actions brought under section 
12(2) of the Securities Act). 
188. See supra note 158. 
189. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (Justices White, 
Blackmun, and Stevens dissented). 
190. Id. at 1654 (White, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (The Indiana Con-
trol Shares Acquisition Chapter, in some circumstances, prevents minority sharehold-
ers from "acting in their own best interests by selling their stock."). 
191. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) ("arguable breach of con-
tract" by tender offeror who rescinds its offer after it has been fully subscribed does 
not violate section 14(e) of the Exchange Act inasmuch as rescission does not consti-
tute a "manipulative act" nor does it involve any misrepresentation or nondisclosure). 
192. See supra note 153. 
193. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (certificate of deposit is not a se-
curity); cf International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); United Hous. 
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
194. Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063 (1988). One might argue that the Court was 
"liberal" in its interpretation of the term "seller" in this case, in that it did not limit 
the term's application to those who pass title. Id. at 2076. However, the Court in de-
fining the scope of the term "seller" rejected a number of far broader interpretations 
which had been adopted by the circuit courts. Id. at 2080 n.25. 
195. E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
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They were frequently joined that period by Justices Stevens and 
Marshall.196 Justices Blackmun and Brennan continued their 
steadfast support of shareholder protection in the 1980s197 while Jus-
tices Stevens and Marshall became increasingly vocal in matters re-
lating to shareholder rights.198 When Justice Scalia joined the Court 
in 1986, he fell predictably into the conservative camp in securities 
cases.199 
By the time Justice Kennedy joined the Court in February of 1988, 
the philosophical camps on the Court were firmly set. On a contin-
uum embracing the considerations previously discussed--caseload, 
class action access, managerial prerogative, federalism and statutory 
integrity-with only occasional aberrations, the ideological lines were 
clearly drawn: 
Rehnquist 
White 
O'Connor 
Scalia 
Kennedy?200 
Blackmun 
Brennan 
Marshall 
Stevens 
It· was in this context that Basic, Inc. v. Levinson20l came before the 
Court. 
II. BASIC, INC V. LEVINSON 
Basic, a spiritual descendant of the Borak-Mills era, involved the 
complaint of a small shareholder suing on behalf of other sharehold-
ers similarly situated. Max Levinson's complaint, like those of the 
plaintiffs in Borak and Mills, was that he and other class members 
had been defrauded when Basic, Inc., in which they had invested, 
196. E.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). It has 
been said that Justice Marshall was essentially "indifferent, even demonstrably bored" 
by such cases. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 291 (1985); see, e.g., cases cited 
supra notes 84-85. 
197. E.g., Dirks V. SEC, 453 U.S. 646 (1983). 
198. E.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (White, Black-
mun and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 422 
U.S. 220 (1987) (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part; Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Dirks v. SEC, 463 
U.S. 646 (1983) (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring; Brennan, J ., concurring; 
Blackmun and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). 
199. E.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment); Shearson/ American Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
200. Justice Kennedy, while sitting on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
had only two occasions to write in the field of securities laws, and they provide us with 
scant guidance. In Texas Partners v. Conrock Co., 685 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1982), he 
wrote to reverse the premature grant of summary judgment in a non-class case 
brought under rule 14(a). In SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980), the issue 
was the propriety of enjoining non-parties from taking action against entities in SEC 
receivership. 
201. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988). 
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withheld material information from them. Unlike Borak and Mills, 
no proxy solicitation was involved; therefore, Levinson's claim fell 
under rule 10b-5. 
Basic, Inc. had begun exploratory talks in September 1976 with 
Combustion Engineering, Inc., aimed at a possible merger.2o2 These 
talks were sporadic, with long periods of inactivity. Twice during 
1977 and 1978, Basic's management had deflected inquiries from re-
porters and from the New York Stock Exchange concerning unusual 
market activity in Basic's stock, once specifically denying that any 
pre-merger negotiations were underway.2o3 In November 1978, Basic 
issued a report to its shareholders, again disavowing knowledge of 
"any present or pending developments which would account for the 
high volume of trading and price fluctuations in recent months."204 
One month later, Basic publicly announced the impending merger at 
$46 per Basic share. 
Max Levinson had sold his Basic stock during the course of the Ba-
sic-Combustion Engineering discussions, and thereby lost the sub-
stantial premium paid in connection with the merger. Levinson sued 
on behalf of a class of those who had sold Basic stock between Octo-
ber 21, 1977 (the date of the first "denial" of merger negotiations) 
and the day of the merger announcement, alleging that Basic and its 
executives had violated rule 10b-5. The district court dismissed the 
complaint on defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding 
that Basic's public statements during the course of its pre-merger dis-
cussions had not been materially misleading.2os 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed 
the summary judgment, holding that, while Basic had been under no 
general duty to disclose its. discussions with Combustion, it had as-
sumed that duty when it denied discussions had, in fact, occurred. 
Further, the court reasoned, "once a statement is made denying the 
existence of any discussions, even discussions that might not have 
been material in the absence of the denial are material .... "206 Ba-
sic, Inc. sought certiorari and two issues made their way to the Court. 
The first issue involved whether preliminary merger-directed dis-
cussions, which had not yet jelled on matters of "price and struc-
ture," could ever be sufficiently "material" to require disclosure to 
202. /d. at 981. 
203. /d. at 981 n.4. 
204. /d. 
205. /d. at 982. 
206. /d. 
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shareholders in the event of inquiry. A court wishing to interdict 
shareholders from seeking relief in the federal courts could easily 
have answered this question in the negative, as the Third Circuit207 
and others had done.2os Instead, however, all six members of the 
Court hearing this case ruled that the question of materiality does 
not lend itself to such a "rigid formula";209 hence, a determination of 
whether pre-merger negotiations have reached a material stage must 
be made by a finder of fact on a case-by-case basis. The defendants 
argued that such an approach would result in ex ante uncertainty as 
to when disclosure should be made. However, Justice Blackmun, 
writing for the Court, dispatched this point observing that it 
"seem[ed] to be directed solely at the comfort of corporate manag-
ers"210 and therefore presumably could be disregarded. Justice 
Blackmun chided, "[a] bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than 
a standard that requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all 
the circumstances. But ease of application alone is not an excuse for 
ignoring the purposes of the· securities acts and Congress' [sic) policy 
decisions. "211 
The second issue before the Court involved whether the fraud-on-
the-market theory could serve to satisfy the reliance requiremepts of 
rule 10b-5.212 The district court had certified a class comprised of 
Basic shareholders who had sold their shares after the date of Basic's 
first allegedly-misleading public statement.213 In order to find that 
common questions of fact or law predominated over questions appli-
cable to individual plaintiffs, the district court had adopted a reputa-
ble presumption that all putative class members had relied on the 
integrity of Basic's market price on the date of the sale, and that this 
market price necessarily reflected the allegedly misleading public 
statements made by the company.214 Thus, by relying on a market 
price which had been "defrauded" by false statements, the plaintiffs 
could be said to have· relied on those statements, even though they 
may never have heard or read them. In short, the court utilized the 
207. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 
u.s. 1215 (1985). 
208. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 984 n.10. 
209. Id. at 986-87. 
210. Id. at 985. 
211. Id. Justice Blackmun's treatment of corporate managers' not unreasonable 
wishes for certainty in their transactional negotiations is reminiscent of his tone ("pre-
ternatural solicitousness") in the Blue Chip dissent. See supra note 105 and accompa-
nying text. 
The materiality portion of the Court's decision in Basic has been discussed else-
where. See, e.g., Classen, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson: Is Silence Really Golden?, 23 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 607 (1988); Matheson, Corporate Disclosure Obligations and the Pa-
rameters of Rule 10b-5: Basic Inc. v. Levinson and Beyond, 14 J. CORP. L. 1 (1988). 
212. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 988-89. 
213. Id. at 981-82 & n.5. 
214. Id. 
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fraud-on-the market theory, which had been adopted by "nearly 
every court that has considered the proposition."215 
In reviewing the fraud-on-the-market theory, the Court addressed 
an issue which had the greatest potential to impact the number of 
shareholder class actions since it upheld the "purchase or sale" re-
quirement in Blue Chip.216 Adoption by the circuit courts of fraud-
on-the-market as a basis for solving the "reliance problem" had 
opened a whole new arena for scrutiny by plaintiffs' class action law-
yers. Previously most courts had held that actions under rule lOb-5 
for allegedly material misstatements or omissions could be main-
tained on behalf of a class only wh~n the corporate defendant had is-
sued a document, such as a prospectus or annual report, which a 
court could reasonably assume had been sent to, and therefore pre-
sumably relied upon by all members of the proposed class.217 Fraud-
on-the-market provided a basis for class treatment in a host of other 
circumstances, such as the press releases involved in Basic, in which 
no document had been sent directly to shareholders. Moreover, 
under a fraud-on-the-market theory, shareholders who had 
purchased after a misleading document was issued could join in such 
actions.21s In either case, the classes of shareholders entitled to sue 
under rule lOb-5 were suddenly much broader than before. 
Since the fraud-on-the-market theory first emerged in the mid-
1970s and spread among the circuits, many classic "strike suits" 
brought on a contingent basis by lawyers acting for a small share-
holder seeking to represent a large class of similarly situated share-
holders have been pursued.219 Thus the potential impact of the 
215. Id. at 991 & n .25. Fraud-on-the-market prior to Basic has been discussed in 
Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements 
in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REV. 435 (1984); see also Rapp, Rule 
JOb-S and "Fraud-on-the-Market"-Heavy Seas Meet Tranquil Shores, 39 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 861 (1982); Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery 
Under SEC Rule JOb-S, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627 (1982); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Mar-
ket Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982); Note, The Fraud on the Market Theory: Effi-
cient Markets and the Defenses to an Implied lOb-S Action, 70 IOWA L. REV. 975 (1985). 
216. See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text. 
217. E.g., Livesay v. Pun"ta Gorda Isles, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 386, 387 (E.D. Mo. 1974) 
(individual reliance need not be shown where class members were sent registration 
statement and prospectus), rev 'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1977), rev 'd 
sub nom. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). 
218. E.g., Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 367 n.9 (8th Cir. 1986) (bondhold-
ers who may never have received offering prospectus but purchased in aftermarket 
need not show reliance). 
219. E.g., In re Texas Int'l Sec. Litig., 114 F.R.D. 33 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (lawyers in 
fraud-in-the-market class action from famed Pomerantz strike suit firm in New York). 
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Court's view of the fraud-on-the-market theory in Basic was clear. If 
the Court rejected the fraud-on-the-market theory, the tide of such 
cases would be stemmed. If the Court accepted the theory, such 
cases would not only continue, but in the wake of Supreme Court ac-
ceptance, probably increase. 
But the potential impact on "caseload" was only one of the consid-
erations which the Court had to take into account in deciding 
whether to hear, and ultimately how to resolve, the fraud-on-the-
market issue. Other recurring issues on the conservatives' agenda 
were presented as well.22o Fraud-on-the-market raised fundamental 
issues relating to the conservative majority's concern about lawyer-
generated class actions. The sole purpose for the fraud-on-the-mar-
ket rule was to facilitate shareholder class actions,22t and advocacy 
for its adoption came exclusively from strike suit lawyers. In addi-
tion, fraud-on-the-market defendants are stock issuers and ongoing 
corporate enterprises. Therefore, to the extent that the theory is 
bound up with questions concerning when a corporation has a duty to 
disclose business information,222 fraud-on-the-market also presented 
the potential for decisions gravely intrusive to managerial discretion. 
Under these circumstances, when the Court granted certiorari in 
Basic, an observer who had followed the pattern of decisions de-
scribed above might have predicted with some confidence that fraud-
on-the-market as a substitute for proof of reliance was unlikely to 
succeed.223 That confidence would have been well-founded until the 
observer learned that three of the Court's most conservative mem-
bers, including Chief Justice Rehnquist, would not be participating in 
the decision.224 
As a result of the unexplained failure of Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Scalia to participate in the case and the delay in confirm-
220. Unlike Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985), there was no ap-
parent conflict between the desire of the Court's conservatives to limit the scope of 
federal securities litigation and their obligation to give effect to the plain language of 
the statute. Fraud-on-the-market is a judge-made concept based on economic theory, 
not something which flows inevitably from the language of rule 10b-5, nor were any 
federalism issues presented. Fraud-on-the-market is a construct inherently rooted in 
federally imposed disclosure obligations and does not raise issues traditionally rele-
gated to resolution in the state courts. 
221. Black, supra note 215, at 459; Rapp, supra note 215, at 893. 
222. See generally Gabaldon, The Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations as 
an Imperfect Paradigm of Rule IOb-5 Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1218 (1987) (discuss-
ing an issuer's "affirmative duty to disclose"); In re General Motors Class E Stock 
Buyout Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1119, 1129 (D. Del. 1988) ("Absent a specific statutory 
or regulatory duty, insider trading, a fiduciary duty or rumors attributable to the com-
pany, a corporation and its officers have no affirmative duty of disclosure."). 
223. One commentator suggested in 1982 that fraud-on-the-market was "outrightly 
aberrant" in light of the prevailing Supreme Court decisions of the day. Rapp, supra 
note 215, at 865. 
224. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 980, 993. 
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ing a replacement for Justice Powell,22s the Justices who had in re-
cent years most often supported shareholders' rights generally,226 
and class action litigants in particular,227--Justices Blackmun, Bren-
nan, Marshall and Stevens-found themselves in the majority of the 
six-Justice panel. That majority upheld fraud-on-the-market for the 
precise purpose of advancing the ability of injured shareholders to 
sue as a class. 
Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court, the first time he 
had done so in a securities case since Affiliated Ute.22B Extrapolating 
from the Affiliated Ute decision, in which reliance was held to be 
presumed where a buyer had withheld material information from the 
seller in a face-to-face transaction,229 the Court in Basic held that re-
liance could also be presumed in the impersonal trading markets.23o 
The use of a rebuttable presumption in such circumstances would 
avoid placing an "unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden"231 on 
plaintiff litigants and would "facilitat[e] Rule 10b-5 litigation."232 
The Court scarcely discussed the theoretical underpinnings of 
fraud-on-the-market-the efficient capital market hypothesis.233 
Rather, the Court relied on "common sense and probability"234 and 
held that "[a]n investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the 
225. Justice Kennedy joined the Court on February 18, 1988, several weeks after 
Basic had been argued and assigned for decision. The decision was handed down on 
March 7, 1988. /d. at 978. 
226. See supra notes 105-07, 117, 133 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Parole 
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) (plaintiff allowed to pursue issue of whether 
he was proper class representative even though personal claim had expired; Justices 
Powell, Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist dissented). 
228. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. 
229. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. 
230. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 991-93. 
231. /d. at 990. 
232. /d. The practical problem presented by plaintiff's theory was that "[r)equiring 
proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effec-
tively would have prevented [plaintiffs] from proceeding with a class action." /d. at 
989. 
233. Justice Blackmun quoted from Peil v. Speiser, 806 F. 2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 
1986) to describe the relationship between the ECMH and fraud-on-the-market: 
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open 
and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined 
by the available material information regarding the. company and its busi-
ness. . . . Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock 
even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. 
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 988-89. He also cited rece;nt finance literature, but discounted the 
need to adopt the ECMH in order to support the fraud-on-the-market presumption. 
/d. at 991 n.24. 
234. /d. at 991. 
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market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price."235 The 
Court mentioned only briefly the manner by which Basic could rebut 
the presumption of reliance.236 
Not surprisingly, the plurality's emphasis on facilitating class ac-
tion enforcement of the securities law did not sit well with the partic-
ipating Justices who over the previous decade had generally favored 
a restrictive view of private actions under the securities laws. Jus-
tices White and O'Connor dissented from the use of the fraud-on-the-
market theory, in part on the ground that it would encourage "specu-
lators and their lawyers"237 to bring other such suits. Recalling the 
concerns expressed in Blue Chip and Hochfelder concerning the 
"harm" attendant to shareholder lawsuits, the dissenters regarded 
this possibility as the "bitter harvest likely to be reaped from the 
seeds sewn by [the majority's] decision."238 There is evidence the dis-
senters were correct. 
Since the decision in Basic, the lower courts have utilized the 
fraud-on-the market theory in the contexts of the over-the-counter239 
and options markets.240 Even more ambitious uses of the fraud-on-
the-market notion can be foreseen. For example, the SEC has ar-
gued that even where there is no active trading market, as in the case 
of an initial public offering, plaintiffs ought to be entitled to a pre-
sumption of reliance on the integrity of the market not to support 
the sale of unmarketable securities.241 
The question now arises, will the decision in Basic inevitably lead 
to a new flood of shareholder class. actions? The answer is "not nec-
essarily." One possibility is that approval of fraud-on-the-market as a 
basis for satisfying the commonality requirement in class actions will 
fail to survive prompt reconsideration by the full Court in a subse-
quent case.242 
Ironically, however, the fraud-on-the-market theory, based as it is 
235. /d. at 991-92. 
236. /d. at 992. 
237. /d. at 999 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) (Friendly, J ., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)). 
238. !d. 
239. Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 94,138 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
But see Epstein v. American Reserve, No. 79-C-4767 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1988) (LEXIS, 
Genfed library, Dist file) (over-the-counter market is not an efficient market). 
240. Tolan v. Computervision Corp., 696 F. Supp. 771 (D. Mass. 1988). 
241. In Bank Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, 
Ross v. Rice, No. 86-7790 (Aug. 1988). 
242. The approval by a plurality of the court of a principle of law does not necessar-
ily ensure its approval by a subsequent, more "complete" panel. CTS Corp. v. Dynam-
ics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1645 (1987). Given that only a minority of the Court 
adopted the theory in the first instance, there is likely to be less reluctance to overrule 
that decision than is the case where a change of the majority view is the result of a 
change in Court personnel. 
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in the economic theory of efficient capital markets, may not be re-
ceived by the non-participating Justices with the same trepidation ex-
pressed by Justice White.243 While it is beyond the scope of this 
article to discuss in detail the emergence of economic theory as a ba-
sis for decisions in business-related cases, it would seem that Justice 
Scalia in particular is unlikely to agree with Justice White's assertion 
that economic theory is beyond the expertise and understanding of 
federal courts. Nor is Justice Scalia likely to be hostile to an eco-
nomic analysis which is so closely identified with the "Chicago 
School" from which he emerged. Indeed, as Justice White concedes, 
Justice Scalia's former colleague at Chicago, Judge Richard Posner of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has ex-
pressly opined that fraud-on-the-market "produces the 'economically 
correct result.' "244 
It may not be necessary for the non-participants in the Basic deci-
sion to reject economic theorizing or to dispute the validity of the 
fraud-on-the-market theory in order to overrule or at least severely 
limit the decision in Basic. One way out, as Justice White pointedly 
observed,245 may be suggested by the same treatise in which Judge 
Posner affirmed the theoretical validity of fraud-on-the-market. 
Damages under the theory are "difficult to quantify," Posner 
warns,246 which may indicate why the plurality in Basic specifically 
declined to address the measure of damages question.247 Specifically, 
243. In dissenting, Justice White expressed the concern that, in embracing fraud-
on-the-market, the plurality was venturing "beyond its expertise." Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 
995 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting "in part). "[W]ith no staff economists, 
no experts schooled in the 'efficient-capital market hypothesis,' no ability to test the 
validity of empirical market studies, we are not well equipped to embrace novel con-
structions of a statute based on contemporary microeconomic theory." /d. at 994. 
Congress, with its superior resources and expertise, is far better equipped 
than the federal courts for the task of determining how modern economic the-
ory and global financial markets require that established legal notions of 
fraud be modified. In choosing to make these decisions itself, the Court, I 
fear, embarks on a course that it does not genuinely understand, giving rise to 
consequences it cannot foresee. 
/d. at 995. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
244. Id. at 995 n.5 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting R. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 15.8, at 423-24 (3d ed. 1986)). Of course, just as 
"bad economics" may nevertheless make "good law," (see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1653 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment)) so may "good economics" make "bad law." 
245. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 995 n.5 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
246. /d. (quoting R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 15.8, at 423-24 (3d ed. 
1986)). 
247. /d. at 992 n.28. 
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the determination of damages in a fraud-on-the-market case ought to 
take into account "social costs" which may be speculative and diffi-
cult to quantify.248 If damages are too speculative, there can be no 
recovery ,249 
Alternatively, damage determination may require a more conven-
tional, though individualized, inquiry-for example, whether a seller 
of shares in a rising market had also purchased during the period in 
which the market had been defrauded,2so or whether the market on 
any given date was skewed by factors other than the defendant's mis-
representation. If the task of determining damages for individual 
class members were impossible to determine except through separate 
trials, class treatment would be "unmanageable," and therefore, inap-
propriate under rule 23(b)(3).251 By adopting either the view that 
damages in cases based on fraud-on-the-market are speculative, or 
that they are too individualized for class treatment, the non-partici-
pating Justices would not be forced to retreat from the economic con-
cepts underlying the Basic decision while still undermining the 
decision's utility for shareholders. 
Another way of short-circuiting the application of the fraud-on-the-
market theory in shareholder class actions may be to broadly define 
the ways in which the presumption of reliance can be rebutted. All 
six Justices agreed that the presumption of reliance "must be capable 
of being rebutted by a showing that a plaintiff did not 'rely' on the 
market price."252 Justice White gave three examples of situations in 
which a plaintiff could not state a valid claim: (1) "a plaintiff who 
decides, months in advance of an alleged misrepresentation, to 
purchase [the] stock";253 (2) "one who buys or sells a stock for rea-
sons unrelated to its price;"254 and (3) "one who actually sells a stock 
248. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 16.8, at 424 (3d ed. 1986). 
249. Cf Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 543 (1983) 
(plaintiff fails to state claim under section 4 of the Clayton Act where damages 
claimed are "nothing but speculation"). 
250. Cf Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 998-99 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
251. Cf Fischer v. Dallas Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 106 F.R.D. 465, 470 (N.D. Tex. 
1985) (court will not certify class comprised of all persons who had been denied loans 
because of alleged "redlining," because there would have to be a separate and time 
consuming class hearing to determine each class member's damages); Wilcox Dev. v. 
First Interstate Bank, 97 F.R.D. 440, 444 (D. Or. 1983) (court will not certify class com-
prised of all "prime rate" borrowers, where damage determination does not lend itself 
to a simple formula, but will require a borrower-by-borrower hearings). Contra Bogo-
sian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 456 (3d Cir. 1977) (necessity of individual damage 
calculations need not preclude class treatment if common issues predominate); Black, 
supra note 212, at 441. 
252. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 993-94 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
253. /d. at 994. 
254. /d. at 994. 
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'short' before the misrepresentation is made."2ss 
In one sense, this may seem academic when resourceful class ac-
tion attorneys, usually through reciprocal information-sharing agree-
ments with local stockbrokers, are able to find more "acceptable" 
class representatives.256 But in a deeper sense, the issue of how the 
presumption of reliance on a "defrauded market" can be rebutted 
presents the most likely way in which fraud-on-the-market cases can 
be defeated. 
Basic found only that the fraud-on-the-market presumption would 
suffice to satisfy the commonality element of rule 23(a); it did not 
consider the separate typicality or manageability requirements ?f 
rule 23(b)(3)(D). If the grounds upon which a defendant may rebut 
the presumption of reliance on the market are drawn broadly 
enough, as Justice White suggests, and the process of determining 
which plaintiffs' claims are rebuttable is sufficiently complicated, 
class action treatment will be inappropriate.257 
For example, Justice White asserted that a shareholder "who buys 
or sells a stock for reasons .unrelated to its price" should not be in-
cluded within the plaintiff class in a fraud-on-the-market case.2ss 
How could such a determination be made? Presumably, it would re-
quire discovery into the investment goals and mental processes of 
each putative class member, the sources of information consulted 
prior to the purchase or sale and his understanding of market eco-
nomics. It seems that even in Basic, on remand, the precise mechan-
ics of rebutting the reliance presumption are yet to be understood.259 
255. /d. The examples which the majority gives of ways in which the presumption 
of reliance could be rebutted are much narrower and all involve situations. in which 
the··market itself or the individual class member knew or believed the truth despite 
the defendants' misstatement or omission. /d. at 992. 
256. Cf. Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(where class representative is found to be inappropriate, the solution is not decertifica-
tion, but the appointment of a new representative); Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, 
Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 39 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (action does not become most merely because 
class representative loses his interest in it"). 
257. Cf. Abernathy v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 97 F.R.D. 470, 475 (N.D. Tex. 1983) 
(court will not certify class comprised of all optometrists, opthamologists and dispens-
ing opticians in the United States who were subjected to price discrimination because 
establishing entitlement will require very individualized trials.). 
258. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 994 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
259. See Note, Rule lOb-5: An Old Test of Materiality with a New Presumption of 
Reliance, 34 LOY. L. REV. 593, 607 n.llO (1988) (noting the unresolved issues still facing 
the parties in Basic, including "how the rebuttal will work in practice," the standard of 
proof applicable to a rebuttal showing and whether the presumption must be defeated 
"as to all plaintiffs or to a percentage."). 
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Courts which have considered the questions of how and when de-
fendants may rebut the presumption of reliance have reached incon-
sistent outcomes.260 
In the end, it may be true, as Justice' White fears, that it will be 
virtually impossible for defendants to rebut the presumption of reli-
ance.261 Nevertheless, the issue is there to be explored, and Basic has 
failed to provide the lower courts with any guidance in this area. 
Eventually, this may be the issue on which the non-participating Jus-
tices can turn the Basic tide. 
CONCLUSION 
From 1964, when the Supreme Court first declared the existence of 
an implied right of action under the securities laws, until the mid-
1970s, a majority of the Court led by Justice William 0. Douglas con-
sistently expanded the circumstances under which shareholders' suits 
could be maintained. Thereafter, as the Court came to be dominated 
by a more conservative, business-oriented, and docket-conscious ma-
jority, this trend was halted. Further expansion in the lower courts 
was expressly discouraged, especially in cases brought as shareholder 
class actions. 
Then, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the most liberal members of the 
Court formed a majority of a six-Justice panel and, by approving the 
fraud-on-the-market theory as a means of satisfying the reliance re-
quirement of actions upder rule lOb-5, opened the door to a whole 
new generation of shareholder class actions. Whether that door will 
remain open, and how far, remains to be seen. But the questions left 
unanswered in Basic promise to occupy the lower courts for some 
time, and future Supreme Court consideration of the fraud-on-the-
market theory and its application is inevitable. At the point of recon-
sideration, the three conservative Justices who did not participate in 
Basic will face a problematic choice: whether to embrace the fraud-
on-the-market theory and encourage the class action activity that will 
inevitably follow or to reject fraud-on-the-market in its entirety, as 
260. Compare In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130 (D.N.J. 1984) (the 
defense of non-reliance "goes to the merits of the case and cannot be considered by the 
court on a certification motion"), rev'd on other grounds, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988); 
with Epstein v. American Reserve Corp., No. 79-C-47-67 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1988) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, dist. file) (class certification denied where proposed class rep-
resentatives were subject to "unique lack-of-reliance defenses" atypical of other class 
members); and Zlotnick v. TIE Communications, 123 F.R.D. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (class 
certification denied where complex questions of reliance would require extensive indi-
vidualized proof). See generally Comment, Class Actions, Typicality, and Rule 10b-5: 
Will the Typical Representative Please Stand Up, 36 EMORY L.J. 649 (1987); Black, 
supra note 215, at 449-50. · 
261. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 996 n.7 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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Justice White suggests. On the other hand, the Court may, as it did 
in the 1970s, simply chip away at the theory until all the strike suit 
lawyers have gone home. 
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